Saturday, June 27, 2009

Pornea

“I made a covenant with my eyes not to look lustfully at a girl.”
– Job 31:1 (NIV)

FROM THE INTRODUCTION:
As the pastor of a large and growing church filled with strong men, many of them young, I have seen the secret sins of pornography and masturbation paralyze many men with shame, guilt, and embarrassment. I have written this booklet to discuss these matters in a manner that is both theological and practical, in hopes of contributing to each of you experiencing the power of the gospel to forgive, renew, and empower you by grace. Because I am speaking to fellow men, my tone may not be well suited for some women and, therefore, I would request that they not read this booklet, unless they are a wife whose husband has read it first and he can discuss its contents with her in love. For men wanting to encourage other men to lives of purity, I pray this booklet would be a useful and readable piece of literature that you could pass on to as many dudes as possible as a pedagogical tool for cranial-rectal extraction.

Friday, May 8, 2009

HOW JESUS FACED THE TEMPTER

 

DUNG or DISCIPLESHIP

In another class I teach, THE PASSION OF CHRIST, I mentioned how the all-encompassing significance of Christ's Passion makes everything else in comparison merely "B.S."  This is shocking to hear in a theology class. The term "B.S." may not seem like something one would associate with scripture, but Paul does give some precedent for thinking so.  In Philippians 3:8 we find a word which may very well be traslated as "B.S.":

I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord: for whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but dung, that I may win Christ.

The word is translated in this verse as "dung" is, in Greek, skuvbalon.  According to Daniel Wallace (see his word study below), "it takes little imagination to see a derivative and metaphorical sense from the original notion of crap or s**t. One can easily imagine someone saying, 'We were starving and so we went to a man’s field, but since the harvest had recently occurred, all that was left was skuvbala!' ... the word-play seems to be intentional and the meanings of the terms in hellenistic Greek do indeed reflect their roots."

The full word study that follows may be found at http://www.bible.org/page.php?page_id=5318:

A Brief Word Study on Skuvbalon
By: Daniel B. Wallace , Th.M., Ph.D.
 
(neuter noun, used once in the New Testament [Phil 3:8])
 
This essay is a basic diachronic word study on a rare term, found only once in the New Testament, in Phil 3:8. The NET Bible renders this verse as follows: “More than that, I now regard all things as liabilities compared to the far greater value of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord, for whom I have suffered the loss of all things—indeed, I regard them as dung!–that I may gain Christ…”
 
Most other modern English versions have ‘rubbish’ (ESV, NRSV, NKJV, NIV, NAB, REB) or ‘garbage’ (TEV, NJB, TNIV) for the term. At issue is more than whether slang is used in the NT; the sense of Paul’s view of is former life—his life apart from Christ—is involved. If mere ‘rubbish’ is the force, then a sense of worthlessness is in view; if ‘dung’ is the force, then both worthlessness and revulsion is in view.
 
Rather than be fully explicit, this study will address the meaning in more genteel terms and use asterisks where the more sophisticated (or perhaps less sophisticated!) can supply the appropriate letters.
 
Range of Meaning
This word is used primarily for excrement, especially human excrement; secondarily for rubbish, dirt, leavings, etc. It is a NT hapax legomenon (Phil 3:8).
1. dung, (human) excrement
(especially in the plural, as in Phil 3:8); or with a stronger emotive connotation (and the concomitant shock value), crap, s**t. NT: Phil 3:8* (debatable; may belong under definition 2); Other: Plu. 2.352d; Alex. Aphr. Pr. 1.18; Aret. SD 1.15; Artemid. Onirocr. 1.67; 2.14; Str. 14.1.37; J. BJ 5.571; 5.13.7; PFay. 119.7 (i/ii AD).
 
Illustrations:
Josephus’ description of the conditions within the walls of Jerusalem during the final siege of the Romans in the Jewish War (66-73 CE) is intended to evoke the strongest reaction by his readers (Josephus, Jewish War 5.571):
. . . the corpses of the lower classes thrown out through the gates amounted in all to 600,000; of the rest it was impossible to discover the number. They added that, when strength failed them to carry out the poor, they piled the bodies in the largest mansions and shut them up; also that a measure of corn had been sold for a talent, and that later when it was no longer possible to gather herbs, the city being all walled in, some were reduced to such straits that they searched the sewers and for old cow dung and ate the offal therefrom, and what once would have disgusted them to look at had now become food.
 
In Strabo’s description of the rebuilt Smyrna, he lauds the plans and efforts of Antigonus, Lysimachus, and the citizens, noting however one glaring flaw (Strabo,Geography 14.1.37):
But there is one error, not a small one, in the work of the engineers, that when they paved the streets they did not give them underground drainage; instead,excrement covers the surface, and particularly during rains, when the cast-off filth is discharged upon the streets.
 
Proportionately, the word seems to have occurred in the papyri and other non-literary documents far more frequently than in the literature. A good illustration is found in PapyrusFayum 119.7 (c. 100 CE) in which Gemellus informs his son that the donkey driver has bought “a little bundle and rotten hay, the whole of which is decayed so that it is like crap.”
 
2. rubbish, dirt, scraps, leavings
NT: Phil 3:8* (debatable; may belong under definition 1); Other: Jul. Or. 5.179c; PCairZen 494.16 (iii BC); PSI 3.184.7 (plural, AD 292); Sirach 27.4; PRyl 2.149.22 (AD 39-40).
 
Illustrations:
In Sirach 27:4 the word bears emotive force, though it is not as dramatic as a vulgar rendering would suggest: “As when one sifts with a sieve, the refuse remains; so also the filth of man in his speech.”
 
But even in the first century CE the word was used occasionally with no shock value connotations. For example, in the collection of the Rylands Papyri 2.149.22 (39-40 CE) the writer speaks of animals grazing “on the gleanings of my vegetable-seed crop.” Thus “gleanings” or “table scraps” is a legitimate (though admittedly rare) nuance in use during the time of Paul.1
 
By the fourth century CE, the shock value of the term seems to have worn off, so much so that it is even seen as a proper name—cf. P. Oxy. 1.43, verso iii.25 (295 CE). Nevertheless, Chrysostom can refer to skuvbalon as bearing the meaning of “manure” in Phil 3:8, but he seems unaware of its emotive force—even arguing that there is some value in manure! (Cf. Chrysostom’s commentary on Philippians, MPG 62:263-265, where he mentions the word twelve times).
 
As well, in the fourth century CE, the emperor Julian can use the term to describe the earth, though with intent to evoke some sense of disgust by way of contrast (Julian, Orations 179C):
But is not this Logos Attis, who not long ago was out of his senses, but now through his castration is called wise? Yes, he was out of his senses because he preferred matter and presides over generation, but he is wise because he adorned and transformed this refuse [our earth] with such beauty as no human art or cunning could imitate.
 
Related Terms
Words from the skubal- root:
skubalivzein: to regard as dung, to treat contemptuously (D.H. Orat.Vett 1)
skubaleuvein (a derivative from skubalivzein): to regard as dung, to treat contemptuously (Schol. on Luc. Nec. 17)
skubalikov": scorned, filthy (Timocr. 1.6)
skubalwvdh": waste, dung-like (Anon. Londinensis 29.39)
skubalismov": contemptuous rejection; table crumbs (Polyb. 30.19.12; Ps.-Phocyclides 156)
Terms not from the skubal- root:
koprov": excrement, manure—especially as used in animal husbandry (i.e., not as a vulgar term) (Od. 9.329; Hdt. 3.22; Thphr. HP 2.7.4)
skw'r: dung, excrement (Ar. Ra. 146; Stratt. 9)
perivttwmaperivsswma: excrement—apparently used as a medical term in particular (Arist. GA 724b26, HA 511b9; Epicur. Fr. 293; Meno Iatr. 4.35)
cevzw: to empty one’s bowels, to ease oneself (Stratt. 51; Id. Ach. 1170)
 
Summary
That skuvbalon took on the nuance of a vulgar expression with emotive connotations (thus, roughly equivalent to the English “crap, s**t”) is probable in light of the following considerations: (1) its paucity of usage in Greek literature (“Only with hesitation does literature seem to have adopted it from popular speech” says Lang inTDNT 7:445);3 (2) it is used frequently in emotionally charged contexts (as are its verbal cognates) in which the author wishes to invoke revulsion in his audience; (3) there is evidence that there were other, more common and more acceptable terms referring to the same thing (in particular, the agricultural term koprov" and the medical term perivsswma);4 (4) diachronically, the shock value of the term seems to have worn off through the centuries; and (5) a natural transfer of the literal to a metaphorical usage, in which disgust, revulsion, or worthlessness are still in view, argues for this meaning as well.5 Nevertheless, that its shock value was not fully what “s**t” would be is suggested in the fact that in the Hellenistic period (c. 330 BCE-330 CE) the word was also used on occasion for “gleanings” or “table scraps.”
 
Authorial Usage
The usage of this term in Phil 3:8 has been taken in two different ways (each with two variations of their own):
1. (Human) excrement
a. dung (without strong shock value)
b. crap, s**t (with strong shock value)
2. non-excrement
a. rubbish, refuse
b. table scraps, leavings
 
Some scholars feel that skuvbalon in Phil 3:8 means “table scraps,” pointing to the connection with “dogs” in 3:2 (so Lightfoot [1881 commentary, p. 149]). But not only is the connection somewhat distant, and overly subtle, but the absolute negation of any value to the apostle’s former life outside of Christ would seem to require something stronger than “table scraps.” For this reason, others have suggested that “rubbish” is the best gloss for our term (so, apparently, Beare [116], and several modern translations). As Lang points out, however, “To the degree that the Law is used in self-justification, it serves the flesh and is not just worthless but noxious and even abhorrent. The two elements in skuvbalon, namely, worthlessness and filth, are best expressed by a term like ‘dung’” (TDNT 7:447).
 
Moises Silva, whose expertise in lexical studies is well known, sees emotive connotations wedded to the word in Phil 3:8 (Philippians, 180):
And yet the apostle goes even further: what he once regarded highly he now finds revolting. There is no need to downplay the meaning of skybala with such equivalents as “rubbish” (NASBNIV); while such a meaning is attested (cf. Sir. 27:4—the Greek term could be used of various kinds of filth), a specific reference toexcrement is not uncommon and the KJV rendering “dung” is both appropriate and probable.
 
Silva goes on to say that the gloss “crap” would certainly communicate worthlessness, but is probably not strong enough to communicate revulsion (ibid., n. 20). He thus leaves the question of appropriate translation to the reader’s imagination.
 
Besides the reasons we have given for seeing shock value in the word (under “Summary” mentioned earlier), there is one other reason why the intertwined notion of worthlessness and revulsion seems to be related to human excrement. The context of Phil 3:1-8 is both polemical in tone and contrasting flesh vs. spirit in content. As Lightfoot pointed out, v. 2 refers to Paul’s opponents as “dogs.” But it does more than that—it also refers to them as “the mutilation.” This term is a play on words with “circumcision” (v. 3) and is only euphemistically translated as “those who mutilate the flesh.” The etymology of both words reveals the apostle’s true intent: “circumcision” (peritomhv) is made up of two roots which suggest “cutting around” while “mutiliation” (katatomhv) is made up of two roots which suggest “cutting down” or “cutting off.”6 Thus Paul is accusing his opponents of botching the job of circumcision so badly that the victim is left with mutilated genitalia. There is strong shock value in the apostle’s words here.
This statement is followed immediately by a diatribe on the lack of value of the flesh. Thrice in vv. 3-4 is “flesh” explicitly mentioned; it is further implied in references to circumcision (vv. 2, 3, 5). In this section Paul is essentially arguing that if his opponents could claim that the flesh had some value, he would be in a better position to do so. Yet he himself acknowledges that the flesh and his former life as a devout Jew are worthless; he counts them as nothing (v. 8). The crescendo of his argument is at the end of v. 8 where he says “indeed, I regard them as skuvbala that I might gain Christ.” Having said this, he launches into a positive presentation of his new life in Christ. If skuvbala is translated “s**t” (or the like), a word picture is effectively made: this is all that the “flesh” can produce—and it is both worthless and revolting. That the apostle is not above using graphic and shocking terms has already been demonstrated in vv. 2-3. The reason for the shocking statement in v. 8, then, may well be to wake up his audience to the real danger of his opponents’ views. It is not insignificant that there is precedent for the apostle’s white-hot anger over a false gospel being couched in not-so-delicate terms: his letter to the “foolish Galatians” is replete with such evocative language.
 
Conclusion
In Phil 3:8, the best translation of skuvbala seems clearly to be from the first group of definitions. The term conveys both revulsion and worthlessness in this context. In hellenistic Greek it seems to stand somewhere between “crap” and “s**t.” However, due to English sensibilities, and considering the readership (Christians), a softer term such as “dung” is most appropriate. The NET Bible, along with a few other translations, grasp the connotations here, while most modern translations only see the term as implying worthlessness. But Paul’s view of his former life is odious to him, as ours should be to us. The best translation, therefore, is one that picks up both worthlessness and revulsion, and probably a certain shock value.
 

1 Even here it takes little imagination to see a derivative and metaphorical sense from the original notion of crap or s**t. One can easily imagine someone saying, “We were starving and so we went to a man’s field, but since the harvest had recently occurred, all that was left was skuvbala!”
 
2 None of the related terms occurs in the NT.
 
3 This would be expected if the term especially had an emotionally-charged force to it. Its paucity can be seen by a computer search of the Thesaurus Lingua Graecae (1990 version). Out of 3165 authors and over 65 million words (from Homer to 1453 CE), there are only 178 instances of skuvbalon (for comparisons, see the following footnote).
 
4 A TLG search revealed 1736 instances of koprov" and 2858 of perivsswma (or perivttwma).
 
5 I recall reading a papyrus fragment some time ago in which sailors used this term as an exclamation of disgust when seagulls overhead emptied their bowels, but I have been unsuccessful in relocating the reference.
 
6 I am not here arguing for etymologizing as a legitimate approach to lexicography; however, the word-play seems to be intentional and the meanings of the terms in hellenistic Greek do indeed reflect their roots.

 

US & THEM

The  goal of Christian Ethics is to live along the Way of Christ Jesus.  This life includes all we do and everyone we meet.  There exists tension in following the Way because individuals along the Way will have their individual way of following.  To continuoulsy follow the Way together demands that we be able to tolerate things we may find disagreeable; the Christian way of doing this is to first love God as revealed in Christ Jesus so that we can love others as ourselves in faithful imiation of Jesus himself. 

In love, then, we can communicate with one another without turning away from one another.  Any distinction between "us" and "them" need not be an excuse to disrupt community.  Christian ethics defines Christian community, so there will be those who choose to remain outside such community; however, those within Christian community must continually act to invite those outside of Christian community to become part of the Christian community. 

The Christian hope is that God is working to reconcile all things to Himself, having decisively done so already through the Person of Jesus Christ, and that our actions in this life cooperate with the way God is working.  By the grace of God we can be tolerant, imitating God's own gracious forbearance in withholding his sure judgment against us for our own transgressions.  Thus we pray,

Our Father, which art in heaven, hallowed by Thy Name.  Thy kingdom come, thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.  Give us this day our daily bread; and forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those who trespass against us.  And, lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from the evil one.  For thine is the kingdom and the power and the glory, forever.  AMEN!

BEING BAPTIZED

 In class the term "being baptized" is often used in some way.  Since baptism is an important concept in Christian Ethics, I probably should have spent more time teaching how to understand what baptism means.  There is so much to say about this, but I think the writer in the following essay describes very well why baptism is no mere ritual.  What follows is just the opening of an excellent review essay written by an acquaintance of mine, James K.A. Smith, who was working on his doctorate in philosophy at Villanova University when the events he described took place.  I encourage you to read the whole review at http://www.calvin.edu/~jks4/philchristi.pdf 
 
Epistemology for the Rest of Us: Hints of a Paradigm Shift in Abraham’s Crossing the Threshold
James K. A. Smith
Department of Philosophy / Calvin College / Grand Rapids, Michigan 
 
I would like to invite you to a tiny little mission church in north Philadelphia.  It is the site of one of my most treasured memories of ministry, but also an event that constantly challenges my inherited paradigms in philosophy of religion.
 
It is an early winter evening, so darkness presses against the windows of the rented sanctuary as a small group of believers are gathering; light and song push back against that darkness and oozes out of the cracks of the aging, tiny structure. We have gathered for an evening service of celebration as several members of a neighborhood family, new to the church, have presented themselves for baptism. Over the past several months we have witnessed a transformation in the mother and some of her children and tonight they make public profession of their newfound faith by dying and rising in the waters of baptism. The father and some uncles have come for the service to honor those being baptized, but as with previous visits to Sunday worship, they remain aloof, distant, and unengaged. But tonight that will change.
 
Baptism in a Pentecostal church brings together the charismatic and the sacramental: their baptism is situated in a narrative enacted through song and sermon, echoed in the story of their testimonies as they present themselves for baptism. And as they are baptized, Pastor Billings draws upon the materiality and physicality of the sacrament as a picture of the Gospel itself. Tonight it’s not just a matter of telling, but a matter of showing. As the mother emerges from the water it feels as if we are witnessing the resurrection itself.  Pastor and parishioner embrace in tears as the congregation can no longer contain its “Hallelujahs!” and shouts of praise; their songs and prayers become the sound track of resurrection. He is risen! She is risen! As the teenagers are baptized, they each renounce the Evil One and pledge allegiance to the coming King. They have a new story, a new love, a new desire.
 
And then we notice that slowly the father has made his way to the front of the sanctuary. He has been gripped by something in what he has witnessed.  As others notice, a hush comes over the congregation. His brothers with him, we see the father quietly but urgently speaking with the pastor, and then a laugh of surprise and joy breaks across the pastor’s face as he embraces the father and assures him, “Of course!” The men have come asking: “Can we be baptized, too? Can we become Christians?” The waters of baptism stir once again and the sound track of resurrection becomes even louder as an entire family is enfolded into the family of God.
 
Just what happened there? More to the point, to what extent can the regnant paradigms in philosophy of religion think or make sense of a scene like this one? This father’s desire to embrace the Christian story—and be embraced by Christ—was not an instance of intellectual resolution. Christ was not the “answer” to a “question.” Jorge was not drawn to “theism,” and when he, too, emerged from the waters of baptism he did not rise with a new “perspective” or “worldview.” He didn’t die to skepticism and rise to “knowledge” (cf. Rom. 6:1–14). Something other, something different, something both ordinary and extraordinary was witnessed there. Are the dominant frameworks in philosophy of religion able to do justice to what happened there in that tiny sanctuary on a winter night? Or are they plagued by a kind of reductionism and rationalism that is poorly calibrated to understand a scenario like this one? What picture of the “believer” is assumed in our philosophies of religion?
 
 
Abstract:
William Abraham’s “canonical theism”calls into question standard strategies in philosophy of religion
which
(1) strain out the particularities of Christian faith, distilling a “mere theism”
and
(2) position Christian faith within a broader, “general” epistemology.
 
I evaluate Abraham’s call  for a philosophical approach that honors the thick particularity of Christian faith
and makes room for the unique epistemological status of revelation.
I conclude that
Abraham’s promising project could be extended to more radically call into question
the “intellectualism” that characterizes contemporary philosophy of religion.

Friday, April 24, 2009

BECAUSE IT SHOWS

A Brief Consideration of Pornography

in light of “The Theology of the Body”

February 2004

In a course examining John Paul II’s “Theology of the Body,” each student was to designate the following statement as being true or false:  “Pornography is wrong because it shows too much of people.”  

The following essay is a brief consideration of my initial response to that statement, with further discussion regarding how the whole course affected that response and how some pertinent concepts in the Theology of the Body shed light on the question.

The question, as posed, immediately elicited two responses when I first read the statement.  The statement begins, “Pornography is wrong”, then continues “because it shows too much of people.”  Responding initially to the beginning portion of the statement, I thought, “True, pornography is wrong.”  After reading on, I figured this response was intentionally provoked by how the statement was framed rhetorically.  I immediately had to revise my initial response in order to consider whether I agreed with the reason given for why pornography is wrong; that is, was showing “too much of people” the reason why pornography is wrong?  My response changed due to obscurity of the phrase “it shows too much of people.”  I could no longer consider the whole statement to be true.  That phrase provoked further consideration.

Having already considered the question of pornography prior to taking this course, I would immediately agree with the statement, “pornography is wrong.” Having been raised in a family for whom Scripture was the moral compass, I have an inbred aversion to anything condemned in Scripture.  If one defines pornography as “the graphic representation of fornication,” then I am led to conclude that pornography is to be condemned because it involves one imaginatively in fornication, filling one’s mind with lustful thoughts.  Rather than being “transformed by the renewal of [one’s] mind,” one becomes “conformed to the world” as it is portrayed pornographically (cf Romans 12:1-2;. Ephesians 5:1-5).

But how was I to interpret the phrase “it shows too much of people”?  Regarding pornography, I had to first ask what “it” is.  And again, what does it mean to say “it” “shows” something?  The statement presumes that pornography “shows” something “of people” and merely declares that what pornography “shows . . . of people” is “too much.”  What is it that is being shown? Is one assumed to already know what pornography is?  One recalls the man who, when asked to define pornography, said, “I can’t define it, but I know it when I see it!” 

My initial response, therefore, was to disagree with the whole statement as it was worded.  Called upon to elaborate on that response, one could very well venture the following counter-statement, “Pornography is wrong because it shows too little of people.”  In other words, pornography is deceptive because it conceals rather than reveals; pornography is a superficial showing of people, hiding what is deeper than the skin, disguising what is below the surface of sexual activity with a manipulative masquerade of explicit, and even illicit, bodily behavior.  There is more to what is shown in pornography than what meets any of the senses being titillated.  Pornography is wicked on account of its denial of there being more to one’s body than mere sensation.  That denial perversely imitates the wickedness of the serpent in the Garden of Eden, wickedness that led, and continues to lead, to deadly shame (cf Genesis 3:1-8).

Further study of the “Theology of the Body” reinforced my initial response.  I discovered that the “Theology of the Body” presents a vision of the human person that integrates body, soul, and spirit.  This integration is a much-needed corrective to the disintegrating influence of pornography, influence that has adversely affected me, as a person in community with others, and society, as a whole.  During the course, class discussion and reading assignments provoked me to consider how I need to integrate my own thinking so that it is consistently conformed to the revelation of God’s creative order, especially in relation to Jesus Christ.  God is love and expressed his love bodily in Christ Jesus (cf 1st John 4:7-11), being born of a woman, living as a man, suffering and dying, then rising again, showing himself alive to his followers.  Showing himself, Christ showed God’s love.  Such graphic expression of love is the essence of Christianity.

Pornography intentionally confuses love with concupiscence. Christopher West discusses the source of this confusion in his Theology of the Body Explained: A Commentary on John Paul II’s “Gospel of the Body” (Boston: Pauline, 2003; pp 183-186, “The Grave Error of Manichaeism”):

Manichaenism particularly devalues all things sexual. . . . Hence, [John Paul II] firmly and repeatedly stresses that “the Manichaen way of understanding and evaluating man’s body and sexuality is essentially alien to the Gospel.” . . . This assignment of the Manichaen “anti-value” to the body can be seen in the tendency to describe sex or certain body parts as “dirty.” . . . While it may be unconscious or unintentional on the part of [one scolding another viewing pornography for looking at “dirty pictures”], the assignment of evil is [put] on the body . . . instead of on the evil of lust behind the production and the viewing of pornography.  As John Paul says, pornographic portrayals of the body “arouse objection . . . not because of their object, since the human body in itself always has its inalienable dignity – but because of the quality or way of its reproduction,” which is intended to incite lust.

It is pornographic to present lust as love.  Pornography is a concupiscent contradiction to the nakedness without shame that is expressly intended by God (cf Genesis 2:25) to be experienced uniquely by husband and wife: “the concupiscence of the flesh . . . distorts the truth of the ‘language of the body’ ” (quoted by West in Theology of the Body Explained, p 446).  The word “pornography” was derived from the Greek, pornea, which is also the root of the English word “fornication.”  One particularly pertinent text can be found in Ephesians 5:1-5 (New King James Version):

Therefore be imitators of God as beloved children.  And walk in love, as Christ also has love us and given Himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling aroma.

 

But fornication and all uncleaness or covetousness, let it not even be named among you, as is fitting for saints: neither filthiness, nor foolish talking, nor coarse jesting, which are not fitting, but rather giving of thanks.  For this you know, that no fornicator, unclean person, nor covetous man, who is an idolater, has any inheritance in the kingdom of God.  Let no one deceive you with empty words, for because of these things the wrath of God comes upon the sons of disobedience.  Therefore do not be partakers with them.

Jesus Christ “is the image of the invisible God” (Colossians 1:15, NAB); yet, embodied in flesh, God in Christ did not despise the body:  “though he was in the form of God, . . . he emptied himself, taking the form of a slave” (Philippians 2:6-7, NAB).  He then lived just as humans must live, suffering the limitations of the body yet still able to please God.  Those who follow Him are called to do likewise: “I have given you a model to follow, so that as I have done for you, you should also do” (John 12:15, NAB).  Having such a graphic role model, Christians must become “imitators of God” by living their lives as Christ did, as “an offering and a sacrifice to God.” (Ephesians 5:1-2, NKJV). Rather than walking in lust, as do those who “are alienated from God” (Ephesians 4:17-20, NAB), Christians are to “walk in love, as Christ also has loved us” (Ephesians 5:2, NAB).

What pornography shows is not merely too much or too little of people; pornography deceitfully shows an image of the human body that is indubitably false.  It is this false showing that is wrong, making pornography have no place in the theater of Christianity: “we have become a spectacle [Greek theatron] to the world . . .” (1 Corinthians 4:9, New American Bible).  The Christian show must not be pornographic, but philographic, or rather agapographic, showing in how we live with one another, not the lust of man or woman, but the love of God in Christ.   Others, seeing our witness, can then come to know God’s love in which we share through Jesus Christ, because it shows: “For in him dwells the whole fullness of the deity bodily” (Colossians 2:9-10, NAB, italics mine). 

 

THE PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE

Cardinal Francis George met with President Obama to discuss some of the current ways that the Church can help promote the good of the people of America … as well as some of the serious “challenges” the current administration is presenting. 

The effort to “remove” the protection of "conscience” is a matter of consequence for everyone.   

This is Cardinal George’s brief “you tube”   clip - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6NoCRwMqVzQ    

Notes re MORAL THEOLOGY according to VERITATIS SPLENDOR

Christian Ethics

Moral Theology
 
The moral life, has an essentially teleological character,
since it consists in the deliberate ordering of human acts to God,
the supreme good and ultimate end (telos)of man.
(n. 73)                                         cf. 2 Corinthians 5:10 re: "Last Judgment"
 
Moral action concerns human will, the act of free choice.
moral object is the object of human will.
 
Moral actions are those freely chosen acts that are ordered to the goods of human persons.
Human actions  have an existential and religious significance
                  and  are primarily specified by the object chosen.
 
The morality of the human act
depends primariliy and fundamentally on
the 'object' rationally chosen by the deliberate will.
(n. 78)
 
In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally,
it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. 
The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behavior.
To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason,
it is the cause of the goodness of the will; it perfects us morally....
By the object of a given moral act ... one cannot mean
a process or an event in the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of
its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world.
Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision                                                               cf. Romans 3:8
which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person
(n. 78).
 
The "object" primarily specifying an act morally is precisely
what one "chooses."
It is                                                         the "object"  of one's choice,                                              
of what one freely wills to do                        
and,                               by freely willing to do  this specific deed,
one makes oneself to be the kind of person willing to do this.
Thus,       if the object of my choice is knowingly to have intercourse with someone other than my spouse,
                I freely choose to commit adultery and make myself to be an adulterer.
 
The "object" is not a mere physical event, a "piece" of behavior in the external world.
It is a moral object 
only because
it is the object of human will,
the act of choice.
A human act is not a "thing" having a nature of its own independent of how any human will act.
A human act, precisely as human and moral, flows    from a person's "heart,"
                                                                                    from a person's will.
How do moral norms protect human rights?                                      cf. n. 96
Moral norms prescribe the free choice of acts ordered to the goods of human persons.
Human personhood holds inherent human dignity which is upheld by human rights.
Human rights are inviolable; if it is absolutely wrong to violate a person’s human rights,
than it is apparent that some objects of human choice are intrinsically evil.
Thus, the moral norms proscribing intrinsically evil acts must be absolute and without exception.                          cf.  n. 80
Were there no absolute moral norms proscribing intrinsically evil acts, there would be no inviolable human rights
 
How does the Crucified Christ provide the answer to
why we must obey “universal and unchanging norms”?
Through His Crucifixion, Christ Jesus suffered evil rather than do it. 
As Christians, we must be willing to be witnesses of His perfect example in our own lives. 
Such witness can very well lead to martyrdom (martyr being the Greek word for witness). 
Martyrdom is senseless unless there are absolute moral norms prohibiting evil acts.
 
It is false and illusory to attribute “human meaning” to an act morally evil in itself, even in exceptional circumstances. 
To do so is a violation of any person’s “humanity.”                                                                                     cf. nn. 90-94
 
It seems humanly impossible, at times, to avoid doing evil to prevent some alleged greater evil.
At such times, what the Church teaches may appear to be harshly rigoristic.
How is the Church's teaching on human dignity and on moral absolutes NOT rigoristic or harsh?
The grace of God which has been made available to us through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
 
The Church's teaching on human dignity and, precisely because of the inviolable dignity of the human person, on moral absolutes always and everywhere prohibiting the free choice of acts intentionally opposed to the goods of human persons is not, as some maintain, rigoristic or harsh.
 
God never abandons us and will give us the grace to resist any temptation.            cf. nn. 84-87
 
We are called to imitate Christ through faithful Christian witness.
Christ Jesus suffered evil rather than do it.
The death and resurrection of Jesus Christ makes the grace of God available to us.
God promises that He will give us the grace to resist the temptation to do evil 
even when doing so is intended to prevent some alleged greater evil.
 cf. nn. 102-105
 
Evangelization ... involves the proclamation and presentation of morality.